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I. INTRODUCTION
As recent commentators have described the current, chaotic state of
employment litigation:
This state of affairs may be a boon to lawyers, who can spend their time
making fine points of legal analysis m briefs submitted to the courts. However,
it creates nothing but headaches for employers, who do not know what specific
standards they must meet m terminating an employee nor what the results of a
mistake will be. It creates uncertainties for employees as well, whose rights are
often not determined by the law but rather by the quality and
inventiveness of an individual judge.1
In recent years, few topics have received more attention from legal scholars
than the erosion of the employment at will doctrine. Indeed, as this century-old
ovemding principle of employment relations has evolved to meet the demands
of the contemporary workplace, many of these commentators have attempted to
chart its future course. Exceptions now riddle thfis once solid foundation of the
employer-employee relationship, placing employers in a precarious position
virtually every time they terminate an employee. Among the most significant is
the public policy exception-where an employee can state a claim for damages
when an employer, in dismissmg an employee, violates a clearly manifested
public policy
The Supreme Court of Oio, which m the past had shown its reluctance to
recognize the public policy exception, has recently, in Collins v. Rizkana,2
expanded the scope of Ohio's public policy exception well beyond its previous
boundaries. Currently, it appears that Oio employment law affords a
termunated employee the opportunity to claim damages from its employer,
apparently, for any number of reasons. However, such rapid growth begs the
* I would like to thank Blame Brown and Joe Blasko for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper. Also, I would like to dedicate this paper to my father, Mick
Wagoner, who provided me with the inspiration, as well as the means, to go to law
school.
I Jeffrey M. Hahn & Kevin M. Smith, Wrongful Discharge: The Search for a
Legislazive Compromise, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 515, 532 (1990).
2 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995).
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question-has the Supreme Court of Ohio gone too far? In other words, has the
court sacrificed predictability m the law in order to facilitate amorphous and, at
times, indiscernible public policies? Moreover, have Ohio courts injected
themselves into a role they are ill-suited to perform?
This Comment addresses whether such intrusions into the workplace can be
legitimately entrusted to Ohio courts. In concluding that Ohio courts cannot
adequately address the competing interests of employers and employees, this
Comment suggests that such workplace regulation is properly handled by the
Ohio Legislature. Part II of this Comment provides an abbreviated history of
the employment at will doctrine, along with the concomitant rise of its
exceptions. Part Im narrows the scope, focusing on the rise of the public policy
exception m Ohio. After this discussion, Part IV of this Comment critiques
Ohio's approach to the public policy exception in light of its past decisions,
paying particularly close attention to the problems Ohio's current jurisprudence
creates. Finally, Part V of this Comment proposes a legislative alternative to
Ohio's common law evolution m an attempt to reinstate certainty and
predictability in the employer-employee relationship.
II. HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DoCTI
A. Creation of the Employment at Will Doctnne
Any belief that the employment at will doctrine has a long and stoned
history in the common law is misguided. On the contrary, in looking at the
employer-employee relationship over the course of common law, many have
remarked upon the rapid genesis of the employment at will doctne3 and the
equally expeditious growth of its exceptions.4
In preindustrial England, a general presumption existed of a one-year,
nonterminable relationship between an employer and his employee. 5 The
3 See Jay M. Femman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL His. 118, 127 (1976).
4 See ANDREw D. HILL, "WRONGFUL DisCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF TE AT-
WIL EMLoYMENT DOCrRINE 13-37 (1987).
5 As William Blackstone described the English rule of a one-year nonterminable
presumption:
If the hiring be general, without any particular tune limited, the law construes it to be a
hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the
master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well
when there is work [and when there is not].
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employment relationship, in this context, reflected a master-servant
relationship. 6 The master (employer) was to provide the servant (employee)
with the means to enhance his physical, as well as moral, well-being. In return,
the servant was obligated to work diligently and to obey his master.
7
In its infancy, American common law adopted the English approach to the
employer-employee relationship, presuming a similar one-year, nonterninable
employment contract. 8 With the advent of the industrial revolution, however,
American courts were quick to adapt the employer-employee relationslup in
order to respond to changes necessitated by an increasingly competitive market
place. 9 To meet these changes, a new presumption was created; namely, the
employment relationsup was terminable at the will of either party for any
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARiES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *425; see also
Femman, supra note 3, at 119-20; Daniel A. Mathews, Note, A Common Law Action for the
Abusvely Discharged Employee, 26 HASINGs L.J. 1435, 1439 (1975). In England, the
employment relationship was automatically renewed for each succeeding year if no action was
taken to terminate the relationship m the preceding year. See Femman, supra note 3, at 120.
Moreover, the English courts held the employer liable for breaching an employment contract
if the employer discharged the employee during the one-year period without "reasonable
cause." See 1 BACKSTONE, supra, at *426. See also Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will
and Public Policy, 25 AxRoN L. REv 497, 498-99 (1992).
6 See HENRY H. PERRriT, JR., EMPLOYEE DIsMIsSAL LAW AND PRACtiCE 6 (2d ed.
1987) (describing the employment relationship as a status-based master-servant relationship).
7 See d., see also Ellen R. Pierce et al., Employee Ternmnation at Will: A Pnncipled
Approach, 28 ViiL. L. REv 1, 3-4 (1982) (noting that the master-servant relationship created
reciprocal rights and responsibilities); Debra Drew Cyranoski, Comment, The Model
Employment Tenmnation Act: A Welcome Solution to the Problem of Disparity Among State
Laws, 37 VILL. L. REv 1527, 1530 (1992) (noting the reciprocal duties of the master and the
servant). While some have argued that this paternalistic relationship may have been motivated
by the desire of the ruling class to control laborers' wages, the presumption of the one-year
contract often, m fact, protected employees from being released during unproductive off-
seasons and provided some security from arbitrary employment decisions. The English rule
was based on equitable principles. In the eyes of English legal scholars, mequity would result
if "masters could have the benefit of servants' labor during planting and harvest seasons but
discharge them to avoid supporting them during the unproductive winter[] or if servants who
were supported during the hard season could leave their masters' service when their labor was
most needed." Femman, supra note 3, at 120. The English approach, moreover, applied the
one-year presumption to all classes of workers. Id. (citing CHARLES SMrrH, MAsTR AND
SERvANr 41 (1852)).
8 See Femman, supra note 3, at 122-23.
9 See ul.
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reason.10 Many commentators have suggested that the newly created
employment at will doctrine stemmed, in large part, from the pervasive laissez-
faire approach to econormcs of the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth
centuries. 11
10 See, e.g., Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y 117 (1895). Credit has been
given to Horace G. Wood and ins 1886 treatise on master-servant law which erroneously
stated the nature of American common law at the time. As Wood wrote:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is primafacte a hirng at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to
establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party.
H.G. WOOD, A TREATisE ON THE LAW OF MAsrEn AND SERVANr § 136 (2d ed. 1886)
(footnote omitted). Wood's rule was, for the most part, neither supported by legal history,
legal precedent, nor legal analysis. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710
P.2d 1025, 1030 (Arm. 1985) (noting that "none of the four cases cited by Wood actually
supported the rule"); Seymour Moskowitz, Employment-at-Wll & Codes of Ethics: The
Professional's Dilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REV 33, 35 (1988) ("Wood's Rule was not
supported by precedent, legal history, or legal analysis. The very cases cited by Wood in his
treatise did not support Ins rule."). But see Mayer G. Freed & Danel D. Polsby, The
Doub#fi Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 AIz. ST. L.J. 551, 556 (1990)
("Although the at-will rule was not universal, little question exists that Wood was articulating
an idea that was generally accepted."). The four American cases Wood cited for direct
support were, in fact, far off the mark. See Femman, supra note 3, at 126. Nevertheless,
American courts quickly embraced Wood's new-found rule as law, effectively creating the
employment at will doctrine. See 1 C.B. LABATr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MAsE
AND SERvA rr § 159 n.2 (1913) (recognizing that Wood's rule was the law "in a great
majority of states"); Annotation, 11 A.L.R. 469, 471 (1921).
1 See Cavico, supra note 5, at 500; Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law qf
Employment Temunation, 66 N.C. L. REv 631, 641 (1988); Moskowitz, supra note 10, at
43.
Additionally, these commentators have suggested that the employment at will doctrine
emerged because it was especially well-suited to the favorable business-oriented, social,
economic, and political climate that existed, if not flourished, during tis period. See
Femman, supra note 3, at 131. As the industrial revolution took hold in the United States,
there "came the decline of the master-servant relationship and the rise of the more impersonal
employer-employee relationslup." Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1030. Emerging industrialists
demanded wide-ranging ability to regulate their workforce in order to compete in the
increasingly Darwinian markets. With the rise of the employment at will doctrine, employers
were now empowered with the unfettered discretion to continually upgrade their labor force
or the flexibility to disrmss employees during cyclical downturns in business. Furthermore,
the employer potentially received increased productivity from the employees, who now had a
keen motivation to maintain high performance standards in order to preserve their more
1802 [Vol. 57:1799
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After its initial acceptance in state courts, the employment at will doctrine
found its constitutional legitimacy in 1907 with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Adair v. United States.12 Moreover, until the mid-1930s,
tenuous job security. See Femman, supra note 3, at 131. Additionally, the emerging
employment at will doctrine coincided with the then prevalent privileged status of the freedom
to contract. See id. at 124-25. In the early nineteenth century, courts were persuaded that
parties were free to contract to any terms they wished. Moreover, in the absence of any
explicit terms indicating otherwise, the courts felt an employer should not be held legally
bound to any contract provisions upon which the parties did not agree. Likewise, an employee
could not be compelled to work for an employer if the employee chose not to do so.
12 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair, a railroad employee who had fired another employee
for membership in a union challenged the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act, which
crninnalized such dismissals based on union membership. See id. at 170. The Supreme Court
invalidated the law, ruling that it violated the Fifth Amendment guarantees of due process,
liberty, property rights, and the freedom to contract. As Justice Harlan wrote for the majority:
[I]t is not within the functons of government-at least in the absence of contract between
the parties-to compel any person in the course of his business and against his
will to perform personal services for another. The right of a person to sell his labor
upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of a
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from
the person offering to sell it. So the right of the employ6 to quit the service of the
employer, for whatever reason, is the same right of the employer, for whatever reason,
to dispense with the services of such employ&
Id. at 174-75; see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (declaring that a state
could not interfere with the liberty of contract and infringe on "the freedom of master and
employ6 to contract with each other in relation to their employment"). Furthermore, the
Court held that an employer was not under a legal obligation to retain an employee in the
absence of a contract fixing a length of service or controlling the parties' conduct. See Adair,
208 U.S. at 175-76.
In the absence, however, of a valid contract between the parties controlling their conduct
towards each other. . it cannot be, we repeat, that an employer is under any legal
obligation, against his will, to retain an employ6 in his personal service any more than an
employ6 can be compelled, against his will, to remain in the personal service of another.
Id.
The trend of protecting the infringement on the freedom to contract between an employer
and employee continued, and with it, the increasing legitimatization of the employment at will
doctrine. Several years later, in the 1915 case of Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), the
Supreme Court invalidated a Kansas statute that prevented employers from discharging or
refusing to hire an employee because of the employee's membership in a union. See id. at 26.
The Coppage Court recogmzed the "inequalities of forme" existing between the employer's
1996]
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employment at will continued its preeminence in employer-employee
relations. 13 Most states, including Ouo, adopted some form of the employment
at will doctrine. 14 Indeed, the employment at will doctrine is still adhered to in
Ohio with the Supreme Court of Ohio recently holding that an employer can
terminate an employee "for any cause, no cause or even in gross or reckless
disregard of any employee's rights."15
B. The Erosion of the Employment at Will Doctrne
1. Legislative Erosion
Soon after the creation of the employment at will doctrine, legislative
bodies, as well as the courts, began to erode its foundation. During the
economic crisis of the mid-1930s, Congress was forced to re-evaluate the
nature of the employer-employee relationship. In recognizing the gross
inequality of bargaining power between employees and employers, Congress
passed the Wagner Act in an attempt to level the existing inequalities of
negotiating strength between employers and employees. 16 The Act's prohibition
on "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure or employment or any term or
interests and those of the employees. See id. at 17 Nevertheless, the Court adhered to the
Adair precedent and held that the right of the employer to discharge an employee was a
constitutionally protected property right. See id. at 26 ("Upon both principle and
authority that the employ6 shall enter into an agreement not to become or remain a
member of any labor organization while so employed, is repugnant to the 'due process'
clause and therefore void."). These inequalities, however, were the necessary result from
the then virtually sacred property rights and the freedom to contract. See it. at 18-19.
13 Interestingly enough, "the United States is the only major industrial nation in the
world which adheres to [an] employment at will doctrine." HAIL, supra note 4, at 11.
14 See Femman, supra note 3, at 126.
15 Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 656 (Oluo 1995) (citations omitted); see also
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ohio 1985); Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy
& Co., 348 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Oluo 1976); LaFrance Elec. Constr. & Supply Co. v. IBEW,
Local 8, 140 N.E. 899, 906-07 (Ohio 1923).
16 See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). In the course of the application of the Wagner Act,
unions were able to negotiate for a "just cause" standard for termination through the newly
created collective bargaining process. Additional employment safeguards were found in the
inclusion of arbitration provisions for wrongful termination, which often took away much of
the employers' arbitrary termination powers. The Wagner Act, however, did not universally
change the nature of the employer-employee relationship throughout the country. Even at its
peak, the Wagner Act only covered a minority of the workforce. For the majority of the
nonuronized workforce, the protections of just cause disussal and arbitration proceedings
were largely unavailable.
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condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization" 17 afforded employees the first legislative protection from the
harshness of the employment at will doctrine. Later, during the 1960s and
1970s, Congress, in reflecting a concern for civil rights, passed a series of
remedial legislation 18 seeking to curtail an employer's ability to freely terminate
its employees. 19
With the limited scope and availability to most of the workforce of federal
and state legislative remedies, the employment at will doctrine still governs the
vast majority of employment relationships. 20 Recognizing the increasing
harshness and arbitrariness of the employment at will doctrine in the
contemporary workplace, as well as the legislative shortcomings, American
courts were quick to craft judicial exceptions to the rule. These exceptions fall
into the following three categories: (1) the inplied contract; (2) the duty of
good faith and fair dealing; and (3) the public policy exception.
17 29 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
18 In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, prohibiting discrimination
m employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. (1994). As the concern for civil rights grew, Congress passed additional
remedial legislation softening the employment at will doctrine. Included among this legislation
was the Age Discrimmaton in Employment Act (ADEA), see 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631, 633(a)
(1994) (prohibiting age-based discharge by private employers and the federal government of
persons between the ages of 40 and 70 and reprisals for exercising statutory rights), the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1994) (prohibiting retaliatory
dismissals based on an employee's credit history), the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), see 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1994) (prohibiting discharge of employees in reprisal for
exercising their rights under this act), and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1994) (prohibitmng discharge of employees in order
to prevent them from attaining vested pension rights). Congress has continued this trend in
recent years by passing the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), which affords over forty
million Americans protection from employment discrimination on account of their handicaps.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
19 As expansive as these changes may seem, these statutory limitations on the
employment at will doctrine provide only narrow exceptions to the at-will doctrine to certain
employees within a protected class. Yet, the majority of the workforce still lay outside of
these protected classes and thus are subject to the employment at will doctrine.
20 See 1 PAUL H. TOBIAS, LrrGATING WRONGFuL DISCHARGE CLaIMS § 1:01 (1995).
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2. Contractual Erosion
Other exceptions to the employment at will doctrine have been created by
the courts on the basis of contractual obligations. 2' Generally, these exceptions
fall under the rubric of either the "covenant of good faith and fair dealing"22 or
the "implied contract."' 23 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
recognized by a strong minority of states. Courts which have adopted this
exception have determined that implicit in the at will employment relationship is
a covenant that neither party will do anything that would limit the right of the
other to receive the benefits of the relationship. 24 The implied contract
exception, on the other hand, has been recognized by a majority of courts when
the actions of the employer have been sufficient to create an implied contract of
employment.25
3. The Public Policy Exception
Along with these contract theories, most courts have widely applied a
public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. This exception, m
its most general rubric, provides an employee damages when her termination
violates a well-established public policy 26
21 These exceptions, while extremely important m their own right, are beyond the scope
of this Note. As such, only a passing reference will be made to them.
22 For a comprehensive discussion of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see
ToBiAs, supra note 20, § 6:27 to :32.
23 For a more comprehensive discussion of the implied contract exception, see id. § 4:01
to :56.24 See, e.g., Metcalf v. Intermountam Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989) (barring the
termination of an employee when the termination was for the purpose of preventing the
employee from using accrued sick leave benefits); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (stopping an employer from firing an employee to prevent that
employee from receiving sales commissions).
2 5 See, e.g., Toussamt v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)
(finding that an employee's legitimate expectation, grounded in an employer's personnel
policy, statements, or manual, can create an unplied contract, binding the employer to those
policies); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280 (N.M. 1988) (finding a contract implied
from a supervisor's representation that hiring would be permanent so long as the employee
performed is job). But see Rancourt v. Waterville Osteopatluc Hosp., 526 A.2d 1385 (Me.
1987) (concluding that a supervisor's oral representation that an employee would never have
to worry about losing her job was not sufficient to create a contract requiring discharge for
cause only).
2 6 Courts have recognized this exception most often when and where an employee's
termination is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy as expressed in constitutional,
1806 [Vol. 57:1799
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The public policy exception traces its origins to the 1959 California case of
Petermann v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396.27 Other states
were soon to follow As the development of the public policy exception has
varied greatly from state to state, one court noted, "Mhe Achilles heel of the
principle lies m the definition of public policy "28 Currently, there is a wide
disparity among the various state courts concerning both the application and
discovery of the public policy exception,29 not to mention debate over the
legitimacy of the exception itself.30 For instance, m an effort to combat the
statutory, or decisional law. See, e.g., Bishop v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 908 F.2d
658, 662 (10th Cir. 1990); Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (finding that public
policy must be based on statutory or constitutional provisions, not judge-made law or other
sources).
27 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959). Petermann, who had a contract with his employer that did
not state a term of employment, was terminated for refusing to commit perjury at the
insistence of his employer. See id. at 26. The California Supreme Court, emphasizing
California's adherence to the employment at will doctrine, noted that such employment is
terminable at the will of either party. See id. at 27 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West
1992), which is a provision codifying Califorma's employment at will doctrine). Despite the
predominance of the rule, the court held that "the right to discharge an employee under such a
contract may be lirmted by considerations of public policy." Id. As the court concluded:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound
morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether the employment be
for a designated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee declined to
commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute in order to more fully
effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the
employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is
for an unspecified duration.
Id. Petermann marked the first in a steady stream of cases facilitating the growth and the
validity of the public policy exception. See, e.g., Ganit, 824 P.2d at 680 (finding that an
employee who was terminated for supporting a coworker's claim of sexual harassment stated
a cause of action for tortious discharge against public policy); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (holding that an employee stated a public policy exception
when he was terminated for refusing to participate in an illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline
prices).28 Palamateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (. 1981).
29 For a thorough discussion of the inconsistency among the states in the application of
the public policy exception, see Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy
Exception to the Employment at Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TuL. L.
REv 1583 (1994).
30 A vast majority of states allow for some sort of public policy exception to the
employment at will doctrine. However, as of October 1995, five state courts refused to allow
a common law public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. These states
1996]
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nebulous nature of any public policy exception, several courts have restricted
the exception, m varying degrees, to instances where an employer "clearly
violates" a state or federal statute.31 On the other hand, some courts seem more
flexible m uncovering an exception. 32 Coupled with this already disparate body
of law, many commentators note that the enforcement of the public policy
exception varies widely depending on whether the public policy was grounded
m a statutory right, a legal obligation, or in fiurtherance of an important public
interest. 33 Consequently, if not unavoidably, states vary greatly in their
handling of the public policy exception. 34 Coinciding with the recent explosion
of litigation in this area, courts are engendering new public policy exceptions at
an increasingly expeditious rate. The list is seemingly endless. 35
include: Alabama, see Grant v. Butler, 590 So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1991); Hinrichs v.
Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131-32 (Ala. 1977); Florida, see DeMarco v. Publix
Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1253-54 (Fla. 1980); Georgia, see Troy v.
Interfinancial, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 872, 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Mississippi, see Kelly v.
Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 877 (Miss. 1981); New York, see Murphy v.
American Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y 1983). These courts recogize the
inequality of the employer-employee relationship. They reason, however, that the legislature
is the proper body with which to bring about change.
Additionally, the legislative bodies of Montana and Puerto Rico have enacted wrongful
termination statutes. Both statutes codify the public policy exception; thus, their respective
codifications take precedence over the common law. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904
(1995); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (Supp. 1996).
31 See, e.g., Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no
public policy exception to employment at will for discharge due to pregnancy because
expectations are created by the legislature, not the court, and no statute prohibits discharge
due to pregnancy); Schultz v. Production Stamping Corp., 434 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Wis. 1989)
(finding no public policy violation where the employee could not "establish that . [the
employer] required her to violate any constitutional or statutory provision").
3 2 Califorina courts have been among the most aggressive state courts m the country m
finding public policy exceptions. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
33 See HIL, supra note 4, at 6.
34 As the prefatory note of the Model Employment Termination Act (META) suggests,
the variety of rights and remedies among states places an employer in a precarious position.
For example, consider this possible scenario presented in the prefatory note of META. An
employee is hired in one state; works in another; and, finally, is terminated in yet a third. See
Model Employment Termination Act, prefatory note, (National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1991). Innumerable jurisdictional, as well as
substantive, questions arise in this situation.
35 Public policy exceptions have been found in preserving the judicial process, such as
the following: (1) perjury, see, e.g., Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F Supp. 133 (S.D. Ohio
1983); Petermann v. IBEW Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959); DeRose v. Putnam
Management Co., 496 N.E.2d 428 (Mass. 1986); Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818
1808 [Vol. 57:1799
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(N.C. Ct. App. 1985); see also Wlute v. American Airlines, 915 F.2d 1414, 1421 (10th Cir.
1990) (finding an employer liable only if the termination is "significantly motivated" by the
employee's refusal to commit perjury); Bishop v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 908 F.2d
658, 662-63 (10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that an employee terminated because of testimony
given before a congressional hearing states a claim for wrongful discharge); (2) honoring a
subpoena, see, e.g., Wiskotom v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983)
(applying Michigan law) (holding that an employee terminated shortly after receiving a
subpoena to testify in a grand jury hearing, even though he was the subject of the grand jury
investigation, has a valid claim for wrongful termination); Ludwick v This Minute of
Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985). But see Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Ctr.,
784 S.W.2d 921, 922-23 (Tenn. 1990) (holding that where an employee was terminated for
testifying at an unemployment compensation hearing because the employer believed the
testimony was untruthful, the discharge did not violate public policy); (3) serving on jury
duty, see, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (holding that an employee who was
discharged for serving on a jury stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge despite the
fact that no statute existed as the basis for the public policy exception); see also Jeffreys v.
My Friend's Place, Inc., 719 F Supp. 639, 649 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (granting a preliminary
ijunction reinstating an employee discharged in retaliation for jury service); (4) filing suit,
see, e.g., Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990) (finding that, when confronted with
discrimination in the workplace, seeking the services of an attorney was a reasonable attempt
to remedy employer nusconduct and supported a wrongful discharge cause of action). But see
Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 765 (Md. 1991) (finding that it does not
ordinarily violate public policy to discharge an employee for bringing suit against the
employer).
Some courts recognize a public policy exception where an employee was discharged for
the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act. For example, some courts
have recognized a public policy exception when an employee has refused to violate the
following laws: (1) anti-trust laws, see, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d
1330 (Cal. 1980) (holding that an employee discharged for his refusal to violate state and
federal anti-trust laws stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge); see also Haigh v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 676 F Supp. 1332, 1352 (E.D. Va. 1987) (holding that a
former employee's allegations that he was discharged for refusing to participate in illegal
price fixing stated cause of action under Virginia law); Winther v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 625 F
Supp. 100, 104 (D. Colo. 1985) (citing to California law for support in finding that an
employee discharged for refusal to engage m illegal exclusive dealing and tying arrangements
stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge despite lack of standing to sue under anti-trust
laws); (2) consumer protection laws, see, e.g., Laws v. Aetna Fin. Co., 667 F Supp. 342
(N.D. Miss. 1987) (recognizing that a plaintiff stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge
where he alleged he was terminated for refusing to violate the Federal Truth in Lending Act
and a stnilar state law, despite the fact that the Mississippi Supreme Court had not yet
recognized an exception to the at-will rule); see also Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d
270, 276 (W Va. 1978) (finding that an employee dismissed for reporting violations of state
and federal consumer credit laws to superiors stated a claim for wrongful discharge). But see
Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1472, 1475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
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(finding that an employee terminated for failing to participate m a scheme to circumvent
insurance law did not state a claim for wrongful discharge m violation of public policy);
(3) public health and safety laws, see, e.g., Adams v. George W Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d
28 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that an employee who was discharged for refusing to drive a
truck that lacked required inspection stickers stated a valid cause of action for wrongful
discharge); Webb v HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 571 (Ark. 1989)
(finding that an employer violated public policy when it requested that an employee falsify a
business record used m complying with a federal medical cost containment program); Sheets
v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (finding an employee discharged
for urging is employer to comply with state Uniform Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act stated a
claim for wrongful discharge); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn.
1987) (concluding that an employee stated a claim for wrongful discharge because he refused
to pump leaded gasoline into a car equipped to take unleaded gasoline). But see Stuart v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 753 F Supp. 317, 325 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that, where there was
no evidence that the action complained of by the employee would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the employer was violating a safety regulation no public policy exception
applied); (4) other federal laws, see, e.g., Verduzco v General Dynamcs, Inc., 742 F Supp.
559 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that a defense plant employee discharged for complainig to
management about lax security that could result m comprousing national security stated a
retaliatory discharge claim even though he did not report the conditions to any outside
agency); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (recognizing a public
policy exception where a NASA inspector was allegedly discharged for refusing to violate a
federal statute that prohibited and made crminal the falsification of reports to federal
agencies); Peterson v Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) (holding that an employee
discharged for refusing to violate state tax law and federal customs regulations could bring
suit under the state's public policy exception). But see Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 970
F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding an employee terminated for reporting his employer's
noncompliance with the Community Reinvestment Act did not state a cause of action for
wrongful discharge under state law); Rachford v Evergreen Int'l Airlines, Inc., 596 F Supp.
384, 385 (N.D. I1. 1984) (holding that an employee discharged for reporting violations to the
Federal Aviation Administration did not state a cause of action for wrongful discharge
because the employee's claim relied on federal law and therefore did not allege a violation of
a "clear mandate of public policy of the state"); (5) administrative regulations, see, e.g.,
Skillsky v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that an employee
terminated when an employer learned he had filed an OSHA complaint against a former
employer stated a claim for wrongful discharge under California law); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980) (holding that administrative rules and regulations
may form the basis for a public policy exception). But see Merck v. Advanced Drainage Sys.,
Inc., 921 F.2d 549, 554-55 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that a constructively discharged employee
could not rely on state highway regulations where those regulations were not sufficiently
specific to constitute a clear public policy mandate); and (6) codes of etics, see, e.g.,
General Dynarmcs Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994) (finding that a former
rn-house counsel could pursue a claim for wrongful discharge where he was allegedly
terminated for pointing out to is superiors that the company's pay policy appeared to violate
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I. OHIO AND THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Until 1990, Ohio was reluctant to recognize the public policy exception.
Indeed, given Oluo's strict adherence to the employment at will doctrine over
the preceding one hundred years, the emergence in Ohio of the public policy
exception in the past decade has been, admittedly, rapid and expansive. Yet,
during this period of growth, uncertainty, and judicial inconsistency have
dominated the public policy landscape. While much of this wavering can be
attributed to the growing pains associated with the evolution of common law
doctrine, it has nonetheless placed employers in a precarious position. To fully
appreciate the unpredictability inherent in the current common law of the public
policy exception, a brief chronological sketch of the major public policy cases
federal employment law and he hired an attorney to pursue a worker's compensation claim);
Pierce, 417 A.2d at 505 (finding that the professional code of ethics may contain an
expression of public policy sufficient to support an exception to the at-will rule).
Additionally, courts have reached inconsistent results as to whether a local ordinance can
provide the basis for a wrongful discharge action. See Gould v. Campbell's Ambulance Serv.
Inc., 488 N.E.2d 993, 995 (I1. 1986) (holding that where the state left the regulation of
ambulances to municipalities, the local ordinance was not a clearly mandated public policy of
Illinois). But see Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 522 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Mass. 1988)
(holding that an employee stated a cause of action based on public policy where she was
discharged due to her attempt to enforce a local fire regulation).
Furthermore, courts have split as to whether activities related to law enforcement can
serve as sufficient grounds for a public policy exception. See, e.g., Belline v. K-Mart Corp.,
940 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that employees who report unlawful conduct to an
employer can successfully bring a claim for retaliatory discharge); Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (11. 1981) (finding that an employer violated public policy
when he discharged an employee for reporting possible criminal conduct of other employees
to the authorities). But see Giudice v. Drew Chem. Corp., 509 A.2d 200, 202 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1986) (noting that "[pinvate investigation of possible criminal activities of
fellow employees does not implicate the same public policy considerations [as]
cooperating with law enforcement officials investigating possible criminal activities of fellow
employees").
Also, most states recognize a public policy exception where an employee is discharged
for filing a worker's compensation claim. See, e.g., Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666
S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983); Thompson v. Medley Material Handling, Inc., 732 P.2d 461 (Okla.
1987); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087 (Or. 1978). But see Smith v. Gould, Inc.,
918 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Nebraska law); Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d
708, 709 (Ala. 1978). The disparity of application in both the law and remedies in the context
of wrongful dismissal claimis is staggering. Indeed, inconsistency in application predominates
the public policy exception.
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m Oluo is necessary 36 Only then can one understand the consistent reversal of
precedent by the Supreme Court of Ohio in this area.
A. Phung v Waste Management, Inc. (1986)37
An Ohio appellate court first accepted the public policy exception to the
employment at will doctrine in Phung v Waste Management, Inc.38 Phung, a
chemist employed by the defendant Waste Management, brought a wrongful
termination suit alleging that he was dismissed for reporting that his employer
was operating its business in violation of federal and state law 39 Phung claimed
his termination contravened a clear public policy The appellate court agreed by
noting:
[Slimply because the legislature has not acted in this area does not mean that
this court should ignore the recent judicial developments in our sister states.
"The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and the
judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping its common law
principles abreast of the times. Ancient distinctions which make no sense in
today's society and tend to discredit the law should be readily rejected."4°
Thus, in order to keep "current of what is right and just," the court felt a public
policy exception must be recognized to the employment at will doctrine. 41
The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, disagreed. 42 The court refused to
recognize the public policy exception, holding that Phung's claims were nothing
more than "broad, conclusory allegations that Waste Management, Inc. was
violating certain unspecified legal and societal obligations." 43 The court, using
the Oluo Constitution, believed that the state legislature, not the courts, was the
36 For a background of Oluo's treatment of the employment at will doctrne prior to its
acceptance of the public policy exception, see generally Eugene N. Lindenbaum, Note, The
Status of the Employment-at-Will Doctnne in Oho: Ohio Incorporates a Public Policy
Exception, 52 Oino ST. L.J. 315, 319-25 (1990).
37 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ouo 1986).
38 C.A. No. S-84-4, 1984 WL 14394 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1984).
39 See Phung, 491 N.E.2d at 1115. The defendant, which operated a toxic waste
disposal facility, allegedly was violating, on a large scale basis, "its legal and societal
obligations." Id.
40 Phung, 1984 WL 14394, at *5. Interestingly enough, this decision was written by
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Douglas while he was an appellate judge for the Sixth District
Court of Appeals.
41 See 1d.
42 See Phung, 491 N.E.2d at 1116-17
43 Id. at 1116.
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proper branch to protect the welfare of employees. 44 Thus, the Ohio
Legislature's silence on this issue was construed to be a denial of the right to
relief for such a claim. 45
B. Greeley v Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc. (1990)
Soon after Phung was decided, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed
precedent and, for the first time, recognized a public policy exception to the
employment at will doctrine in Greeley v Miami Valley Maintenance
Contractors, Inc.46 In the case, Greeley alleged that he was wrongfully
terminated by his employer when it received a court order to garnish his wages.
Specifically, Greeley's wages were garnished for his refusal to meet his child
support obligations. 47
In interpreting the statute, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the
legislature would not have intended to allow employers to circumvent the goals
of the statute, namely ensuring fulfillment of child support payments, by paying
a minimal fine.48 In fact, in order to facilitate the goals behind the statute,
reinstatement and backpay must be an available remedy 49 Thus, a "sufficiently
44 See Ad. at 1117 ("[The Oluo Constitution delegates to the legislature the primary
responsibility for protecting the welfare of employees. ").
45 Justice Brown's dissent m Phung, however, was a harbinger of things to come for the
public policy exception in Oluo. See At (Brown, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Brown
reiterated many of the same concerns evident in Justice Douglas's appellate court decision. In
the absence of legislative action, Justice Brown felt the court was under an obligation to
provide remedies where an employee's rights have been seriously violated. See id. at 1120
(Brown, J., dissenting). As such, Justice Brown argued that because the employment at will
doctrine was a judicially created rule, the court was faced with an even more compelling
obligation to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
See At (Brown, J., dissenting) By responding to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Phung
v. Waste Management, Inc., the Oluo Legislature became one of the first states m the country
to pass a whistleblower's protection act. For a discussion of whistleblower protection acts see
infra note 123.
46 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1994).
47 Because terminating an employee for such a reason violated OHo REv CODE ANN.
§ 3113.213(D) (Baldwin 1994), the employer was fined five hundred dollars. The statute,
however, did not provide Greeley with a means to seek reinstatement. The lower courts were
reluctant to recognize Greeley's tort claim for wrongful discharge because Ohio at the time,
as a result of Phung, was reluctant to recognize a public policy exception.
48 Greeley, 551 N.E.2d at 985. Although the statute did not explicitly provide for a civil
remedy of reinstatement or backpay, there was little reason to doubt that the legislature had
intended to preclude tis remedy.
4 9 See Ad. at 985-86.
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clear public policy" was found.50 Moreover, the court realized that other public
policy exceptions might be recognized if the discharges were "of equally
serious unport as the violation of a statute." 51
C. Tulloh v Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992)
In TulOh v Goodyear,52 the Supreme Court of Ohio retreated from
allowing public policy to be determined from sources other than statutes.
Tulloh, a former uramum materials handler employed by the Goodyear Atomic
Corporation, alleged that he was terminated as a result of his demands that his
employers' "plant be operated in a manner consistent with statutory, regulatory
and societal obligations." 53 The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, found that
Tulloh had not stated a claim for relief. The court held that "[a]bsent statutory
authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge
claim. "54 The court felt Tulloh was unable to base his wrongful termination
charge upon any statutory authority and, hence, did not fall under the public
policy exception. 55
50 Id. at 986. The court m Greeley pointed out that the public policy exception found was
merely a "modification" of the employment at will doctrine. In fact, the court explicitly
pointed out that Greeley was still m harmony with past decisions, including Phung, and that
the employment at will doctrine was still "alive and well" in Olo. Id. However, Greeley did
establish that the right of an employer to terminate for "any cause" no longer included
situations where the discharge would thwart the clear intention of a statute and thus
contravene public policy. Id. at 987
51 Id.
52 584 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 1991), overnded by Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51 (Oluo
1994).
53 Id. at 730. In addition to filing an intentional tort claim, Tulloh also filed a wrongful
termination claim. The trial court disrmssed Tulloh's claim on a jurisdictional issue. See it. at
731. Specifically, the trial court dismissed Mr. Tulloh's claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction as a result of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). On
appeal to the appellate court, Tulloh's claim was dismissed because, according to the court,
there was no statutory basis for Tulloh's wrongful termination claim. Tulloh also alleged an
intentional tort claim. Specifically, he alleged that while working at the plant, he was exposed
to radioactive dust, chips, and fumes causing him severe bodily harm. See it. at 731. Among
Ins injuries, Tulloh complained of "sinusitis, pharyngitis, laryngitis, abdominal plain [sic],
cramping, vomiting, nausea and extreme upper respiratory and gastrointestinal dysfunction."
Id.
54 Id. at 733.
55 See it. at 734. In Is dissent, Justice Douglas correctly predicted the future course of
the employment at will doctrine in Oluo. See it. (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas claimed
that the majority had rmsread Greeley and consequently, had misapplied the law. Douglas
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D. Painter v. Graley (1994)
This limited scope of possible public policy exceptions, however, was to be
short lived. In Painter v Graley,56 the Supreme Court of Oluo opened the door
to a wide variety of sources from which a public policy exception could be
discerned. Shirley Painter, a former chief deputy clerk of municipal courts,
brought a wrongful termination suit against her supervisors alleging that her
termination for running for city council violated a clear public policy 57
As a result of a statute allowing for a municipal supervisor's discretion in
terminating employees, the Supreme Court of Oluo found that Painter was pre-
read Greeley differently, writing that he "would reaffirm the view m Greeley that the
public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine need not be premised solely upon
the violation of a specific statutory provision." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting)
The foundation of the majority's position of clear statutory intent was further shaken by
the presence of a fragile five to three majority where two votes m the majority were from
substitute judges. The judges sitting as substitutes were Judge Dean Strausbaug of the Tenth
Appellate District sitting for Justice Holmes and Judge Stephen R. Shaw of the Third
Appellate District sitting for Justice Herbert K. Brown. Both judges voted m the majority. See
id. at 733.
56 639 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio 1994).
57 See Id. at 55. Painter formally declared to her supervisors that her reason for leaving
was "to seek political office m the City of Cleveland." In order to allow herself time to
campaign, Painter requested a leave of absence from her job for an indefinite period of time.
During her campaign, the assistant personnel director for the municipal clerk's office, Charles
Graley, notified Painter that she had been terminated from her employment at the clerk's
office. See id. at 52.
In response to her disnussal, Painter filed suit in state court demanding reinstatement to
her chief deputy clerk position, an award for backpay, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.
The trial court, basmg its decision on the common law of other jurisdictions, awarded
summary judgment in favor of Painter and ordered that she be reinstated to her former
position along with backpay. The trial court based its decision on the common law of
Californa, Illinois, and Minnesota. See id. at 53; see Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st
Cir. 1973); Vincent v. Maeras, 447 F Supp. 775 (S.D. 111. 1978); Johnson v. Cushing, 483
F Supp. 608 (D. Minn. 1980).
The Eighth District Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court and ordered
judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee Graley. See Painter, 639 N.E.2d at 53. Using the
previous precedent established in Greeley and Tulloh, the court found that Painter had not
established sufficient statutory justification for a public policy exception. See itd. Furthermore,
the court found the trial court's authority in other courts unpersuasive since it construed
federal laws and decisions. See itd.
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empted from stating a common law claim.58 Yet, Justice Sweeney, in dicta,
suggested a new methodology for determining the existence of a public policy
exception.59 Contrary to the limited scope of TulOh, Justice Sweeney found
"[tlhe existence of such a public policy may be discerned by the Oio judiciary
based on sources such as the Constitutions of Ohio and the United States,
legislation, administrative rules and regulations, and the common law "6 In
providing a framework m which to evaluate such dismissals, the public policy
was to be of "equally serious import as the violation of a statute." 61
Unfortunately, Justice Sweeney provided only vague ambiguities of exactly
what criteria made a public policy of "equally serious import as a violation of a
statute." 62 Moreover, the court provided only vague guidance to what
constituted the actual elements of the tort, allowing it to evolve by means of
"how the common law develops." 63
58 The court found that the Ohio Legislature had codified Painter's position as an
employee-at-will serving at the discretion of the supervisor. Id. at 57; see Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1901.32 (Baldwin 1994). Thus, Justice Sweeney felt the legislative directive
precluded the court from finding a "sufficiently clear public policy" for her wrongful
termination suit. See Paimter, 639 N.E.2d at 57
59 'Me court's prior decision in Tulloh had oversimplified the problem, noted Justice
Sweeney. See id. at 56. The court felt that it had the obligation to correct common law errors.
As a result, it set out to remedy the situation. See id. As Justice Sweeney wrote, "When the
common law has been out of step with the times, and the legislature, for whatever reason, has
not acted, we have undertaken to change the law, and rightfully so. After all, who presides
over the common law but the courts." Id. (quoting Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr.,
617 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (Ohio 1993).
Interestingly enough, only a four to three majority affirmed Justice Sweeney's proposed
approach. See Painter, 639 N.E.2d at 57 Only four justices concurred with paragraph three
of the syllabus, with the three other justices not concurring in the new approach. Syllabus
three reads as follows:
"Clear public policy" sufficient to justify an exception to the employment at will doctrine
is not limited to public policy expressed by the General Assembly in the form of
statutory enactments, but may also be discerned as a matter of law based on other
sources, such as the Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, administrative rules and
regulations, and the common law.
Id. at 52 (citation omitted). The syllabus went on to expressly overrule Tulloh. See id.
60 Id. at56.
61 Id. (citation omitted).
62 See id.
63 See id. at 57 Specifically, the court suggested the use of Villanova Law Professor
Perritt's four-step analysis in evaluating a wrongful termination claim might be helpful. For a
more detailed discussion of Perritt's approach, see infra notes 79-80.
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E. Collins v. Rizkana (1995)
1. Facts
Collins v Rizkana 4 is the most recent and perhaps, most relevant case
dealing with Ohio's current approach to the public policy exception. Rebecca
Collins first worked for Dr. Rizkana at the Acme Ammal Hospital in Canton,
Ohio between 1982 and 1986. Throughout her employment, she complained of
Dr. Rizkana's incessant "groping and grabbing and touching." 65 As a result of
the continued harassment, Collins quit her job.66 In spite of Dr. Rizkana's
behavior, Collins returned to work for Dr. Rizkana m 1987 67 Upon her return,
Dr. Rizkana assured Collins that the harassment would stop. Shortly thereafter,
Collins was given the position of manager, earning a salary of $300 per week.
Despite Dr. Rizkana's assurances, Collins testified that the harassment began
again.68  In response, Collins quit her job and filed a
64 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995).
65Id. at 655.
66 See Af. At the time of her original departure, she took no remedial action because, m
her words, "sexual harassment was not thought of I didn't know of the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission or anything of that nature. I went directly to an unemployment bureau."
Id.
67 See .
68 See Id. Collins testified that Dr. Rizkana would physically molest her, along with
engaging m frank and improper sexual discussions. As Collins testified,
[Dr. Rizkana] "would start the same thing. He'd get you in a comer, try to feel you up,
he'd grab your hand, try to put it in his pants. If he had a chance as you were walking
by, he'd pinch your boob. He'd grab your butt when you were in the med room."
Id. (quoting Collins's testimony) Additionally, Collins also testified in her deposition that Dr.
Rizkana was "'constantly talking of sexual stuff, wanting to know how my husband and my
sex life was, that you never lived until you had a foreign experience. He told me about
prostitutes that he had m I do believe it was Paris.'" d. (quoting Collins's testimony).
Despite Collins's loud and verbal protests, the harassment continued. Id. Collins also
testified that, at times, she would tell Dr. Rizkana:
"[D]on't touch me, leave me alone. I would start getting loud. There have been times
when he's put his hand across my mouth to shut me up or he would tell me, 'Shh,
there's customers.' I didn't want him to touch me so I was getting loud." Also, "[t]here
were times he tried to kiss [her]."
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complaint with the Oio Civil Rights Commission. 69
On May 8, 1992, Collins filed a complaint against Dr. Rizkana alleging
claims for wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.70 The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Dr. Rizkana
on Collins's wrongful termination claim. 71 Because Dr. Rizkana never
employed four or more persons at the Acme Animal Hospital, as is required to
fall under the jurisdiction of Oio Revised Code section 4112.01(A)(2), the trial
court could find no statute on which to base its public policy exception. 72 The
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment upon a similar basis.73
2. Ohio Supreme Court-A Multi-Source Public Policy Exception
Justice Resnick, the author of the majority opinion, began her analysis of
the current state of Oio employment law by reiterating that the employment at
will doctrine was still the accepted rule throughout the state. She wrote:
Id. (quoting Collins's testimony).
69 She was precluded, however, from filing a complaint because Dr. Rizkana at no time
employed four or more workers and therefore, did not fall under the jurisdiction of Ohio
Revised Code section 4112.01(A)(2) wich linits the jurisdiction of the statute to those
employers who employ any more than four employees at any time. Id.
70 In Ins deposition, Dr. Rizkana denied that any form of sexual harassment or sexual
discrimination had taken place. See Collins, 652 N.E.2d at 655. He testified that "[tihe only
time she [Collins] mention[ed] sexual harassment is when she startled] asking for [a] raise and
she saw [the] Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas case. 'You give me $50 or I will sue you for
sexual harassment."' Id. (alterations m original). Furthermore, Dr. Rizkana testified that he
had never reduced Collins's pay, but had warned her that her excessive absenteeism was
becoming a problem and threatened her that if she didn't work consistently, that he would
reduce her pay for every hour she called off work. See d. Upon hearing this warning,
Rizkana testified, Collins quit and threatened to bring forth a lawsuit for sexual harassment.
See .
71 The tral court, using the precedent established in Greeley, held:
mhe Greeley case clearly allows an exception to the employment at will doctrine only
when an employee is discharged in violation of a statute. Plaintiff was not discharged m
violation of R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) because that statute only applies to "any person
employing four or more persons within the state."
Id. at 656 (citation omitted) (emphasis deleted) (citing OHIo REv CODE ANN. § 4112.01
(A)(2) (1995)). Painter v. Graley had not yet become the law of Oio.
72 See d. at 656. As a result, Collins then voluntarily disnussed her other clains. Id.
73 See Collins v. Rizkana, No. CA-9310, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5828, *25 (5th App.
Dist. Nov. 22, 1993).
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The traditional rule in Ohio and elsewhere is that a general or indefinite hiring
is terminable at the will of either party, for any cause, no cause or even in
gross or reckless disregard of any employee's rights, and a discharge without
cause does not give rise to an action for damages. 74
She noted, however, that the employment at will doctrine is "a harsh
outgrowth of outdated and rustic notions."75 In order to preserve the "basic
liberties" 76 of the working man's rights, she recognized that a "proper balance
must be maintained among the employer's interest in operating a business
efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and
society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out. "77 As such, Justice
Resnick reasoned that there may be certain times when a public policy
exception to the at will doctrine is necessary
The court went on to reaffirm Graley, holding that sufficiently clear public
policy may be discerned from not only statutes, but from other sources such as
"the Constitutions of Oto and the United States, administrative rules and
regulations, and the common law "78 The court, moreover, then formally
adopted Justice Sweeney's proposed methodology in Painter 79 Briefly, the four
steps adopted are:
1. That [a] clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal
constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common law (the
clarity element).
2. That dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved mn the
plaintiff's dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (the jeopardy element).
3. The plaintiffs dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public
policy (the causation element).
74 Collins, 652 N.E.2d at 656 (citations omitted).
75 Id. at 657
76 Id.
77 Id. (citations omitted).
78 Id. (citation omitted).
79 In Painter, Justice Sweeney suggested this method n dicta. See Painter v. Graley, 639
N.E.2d 51, 57 (Ohio 1994). Justice Sweeney borrowed the methodology of Villanova
Professor Henry H. Pemtt, Jr. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongfid Dismissal
ClaIms: Where Does Employer Self-Interest Lie?, 58 U. CN. L. Rv 397 (1989).
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4. The employer lacked overriding legitimate business justification for the
dismissal (the ovemding justification element). 80
In dividing the law-making and fact-finding responsibilities between the
judge and jury, the court noted "that the clarity and jeopardy elements, 'both of
wuch involve relatively pure law and policy questions,' are questions of law to
be determined by the court."8 1 On the other hand, the causation element and
the overriding justification element, providing factual questions, are properly
resolved by the jury 82
3. Application
Using this new four-step analysis, the court determined that there was the
presence of the first element of the tort-namely the clarity requirement. In
searching the Ohio Revised Code, Justice Resnick discovered at least two
general sources of a statutory expressed public policy that gave rise to a
wrongful termination cause of action. 83 First, she turned to Ohio Revised Code
sections 2907.06,84 2907.21,85 and 2907.25.86 Concluding that these statutes
80 Collins, 652 N.E.2d at 657-58 (quoting Perritt, supra note 79, at 398-99) (alteration
m onginal). In his article, Professor Pemtt proposes subdividing the jeopardy element into
three subdivisions as follows: (1) Decide what kind of conduct is necessary to further public
policy; (2) Decide whether the employee's actual conduct fell withln the protected conduct;
(3) Decide if the threat of dismissal is likely in the future to discourage employees from
engaging in similar conduct. See Perritt, supra note 79, at 408.
81 See Collins, 652 N.E.2d at 658 (citation omitted).
82 See Ad. (citation omitted).
83 See Id. at 658. She noted, additionally, that each of these elements independently
would have been enough to allow recogrntion of a cause of action on its own.
84 The text of section 2907.06 reads as follows:
Sexual Imposition
(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender;
cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with the offender;
or cause two or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the following
applies:
(1) The offender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the other person, or one of
the other persons, or is reckless in that regard.
(2) The offender knows that the other person's, or one of the other person's, ability to
appraise the nature of or control the offender's touching person's conduct is substantially
impaired.
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express a strong public policy protecting sexual bodily security and integrity, as
well as prohibiting offensive sexual contact, Justice Resnick found a sufficient
statutory basis for a wrongful termination cause of action. 87 For additional
(3) The offender knows that the other person, or one of the other persons, submits
because of being unaware of the sexual contact.
(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is thirteen years of age or older but
less than sixteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of such person,
and the offender is at least eighteen years of age and four or more years older than such
other person.
(B) No person shall be convicted of a violation of this section solely upon the victim's
testimony unsupported by other evidence.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of sexual imposition, a misdemeanor of the
third degree.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.06 (Baldwin 1994).
85 The text of section 2907.21 reads as follows:
Compelling prostitution
(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
(1) Compel another to engage in sexual activity for hire;
(2) Induce, procure, solicit, or request a minor to engage m sexual activity for hire,
whether or not the offender knows the age of the minor;
(3) Pay or agree to pay a minor, either directly or through the minor's agent, so that the
minor will engage in sexual activity, whether or not the offender knows the age of the
minor;
(4) Pay a minor, either directly or through the minor's agent, for the mior having
engaged m sexual activity, pursuant to a prior agreement, whether or not the offender
knows the age of the minor.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of compelling prostitution, a felony of the
third degree.
OIIo REv CODE ANN. § 2907.21 (Baldwin 1994).
86 The text of section 2907.25 reads as follows:
Prostitution
(A) No person shall engage in sexual activity for hire.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of prostitution, a misdemeanor of the
thud degree.
Omo REv CODE ANN. § 2907.25 (Baldwin 1994).
87 "In order to more fully effectuate the state's declared public policy against sexual
harassment," wrote Justice Resnick, "the employer must be denied lus generally unlimited
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support, Justice Resnick demonstrated that other courts have found similar
statutes in their respective jurisdictions to also embody sufficiently clear
expressions of public policy 88
Second, Justice Resnick found another source of public policy m an Ohio
civil rights statute.8 9 She wrote, "It is clear that a civil rights statute prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of sex may provide the necessary
expression of public policy on which to premise a cause of action for wrongful
discharge based on sexual harassment/discrimnation." 9
Having satisfied the clarity element, Justice Resnick then addressed whether
allowing the dismissal would jeopardize this new-found public policy Although
each statute provided some specific form of remedies for each violation, the
issue which "most often arises under the jeopardy analysis," Justice Resnick
wrote, "is whether the public policy tort should be rejected where the statute
right to discharge an employee-at-will, where the reason for the dismissal. is the
employee's refusal to be sexually harassed." Col/ins, 652 N.E.2d. at 658.88 Specifically, Justice Resnick compared Oluo law with Maryland, Arizona, Arkansas,
and North Carolina law on the issue of inferring public policy. See Hamson v. Edison Bros.
Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying North Carolina law and
finding a public policy exception motivated by her complaints against her manager stemming
from conduct including unconsented sexual touching and requests for sex); Lucas v. Brown &
Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying Arkansas law and finding public
policy based on Arkansas's public policy prohibiting prostitution); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Ariz. 1985) (finding a public policy exception where the
discharge was motivated by the plaintiff's refusal "to participate in activities which arguably
would have violated our [Arizona's] indecent exposure statute"); Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 767 (Md. 1991) ("The clear mandate of public policy which
Watson's discharge could be found to have violated was the individual's interest in preserving
bodily integrity and personality, reinforced by the state's interest in preventing breaches of the
peace, and reinforced by statutory policies intended to assure protection from workplace
sexual harassment.").89 Specifically, Justice Resnick looked to Oluo Revised Code section 4112.02 (A). This
section reads in its entirety as follows:
It shall be an unlawful discrminatory practice:
(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
handicap, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to
hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to
employment.
Oio REv CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (Baldwin 1994).
90 Col/ins, 652 N.E.2d at 659.
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expressing the public policy already provides adequate remedies to protect the
public interest." 91 She noted, however, that there were two reasons why the
availability of remedies under the statutes would not serve to defeat Collins's
wrongful termination claim.92
First, citing authority from other states, Justice Resnick noted that the issue
of adequacy of remedies is confined to cases "[w]here right and remedy are
part of the same statute which is the sole source of the public policy opposing
the discharge." 93 Because the clarity element had been found from multiple
sources, namely Ohio Revised Code sections 4112.02 and 2907.06, the right
had, in effect, transcended the remedy provisions of these statutes and allowed
for an independent tort claim. Second, Justice Resick noted that the legislature
had not intended to preempt common law remedies by enacting these statutes. 94
In addressing the jurisdictional requirement of Ohio Revised Code section
4112.02, Justice Resnick responded, "[W]e cannot find it to be Ohio's public
policy that an employer with three employees may condition their employment
upon the performance of sexual favors while an employer with four employees
may not." 95
III. PROBLEMS WITH OHIO'S APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION
Undeniably, the Supreme Court of Oio must be given credit for joining
the vast number of jurisdictions recognizing a public policy exception to the
employment at will doctrine. A public policy exception is crucial to the
workplace, not only to protect the rights of individual employees, but also to
facilitate the interests of society as a whole. Indeed, given the reprehensible
behavior of Dr. Rizkana, it would offend fundamental notions of justice not to
afford Collins some form of relief. This Comment does not question Collins's
right for recovery, rather this Comment disagrees with the amorphous
91Id. at 660.
92 See id.
93 Id. (citation omitted).94 Yet, it must be noted that it is impossible to determine exactly what the legislature
intended m this regard. Furthermore, Justice Resick failed to address that both of these
statutes had been passed prior to the Oluo courts' acceptance of a public policy exception to
the employment at will doctrine. Justice Resnick looked to Hel'mck v. Cincinnati Word
Processing, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1212 (Oluo 1989), and noted "that there is nothing in the
language or legislative history of R.C. Chapter 4112 barring the pursuit of common-law
remedies for injuries arising out of sexual misconduct." Collins, 652 N.E.2d at 660 (citation
omitted).
95 Id. at 651.
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framework the Supreme Court of Oio puts forth to grapple with public policy
issues. Particularly, the proposed framework of the court provides little, if any,
guidance to facilitate an acceptable compromise between ensuring employees'
rights and affording employers predictability By granting the courts unfettered-
discretion to determine the proper basis as well as remedies for a public policy
exception, the Supreme Court of Ohio has pried open a proverbial Pandora's
Box of potentially frivolous litigation. 96 Indeed, even in the test's incipient
stages, Oio appellate courts have already been forced to deal with a wide
variety of creative public policy claims brought under the four-part test set forth
m Collins.97
To remedy the situation, Ohio courts are in need of legislative guidance.
These decisions of dividing interest between employee and employer rights are
more conducive to a legislative remedy, wich affords mandated consistency
and methodology 98 Giving Oio courts potentially unfettered discretion
96 See Jay Finegan, Law and Disorder, INc., Apr. 1994, at 64. Finegan notes that
employment related lawsuits have risen by more than 2,200% in the last two decades. See id.
at 64. In fact, Finegan estimates that employment related suits now account for an estimated
one-fifth of all civil suits filed in United States courts. See id. Finegan attributes much of this
increase to the erosion of the employment at will doctrine and the increase m scope of federal
legislation. See id. at 66.
97 See, e.g., DiGiannantom v. Dillon, No. 95-APE09-1198, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS
2542 (10th App. Dist. June 20, 1996) (asserting a claim for wrongful discharge that was a
product of defendant's continual making of gross and revolting sexual remarks and innuendo
on a daily basis); Hillyer v. Timken Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 95-CA-0402, 1996 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2889 (5th App. Dist. June 3, 1996) (asserting a claim for damages because plaintiff
was allegedly terminated for filing a grievance with the Department of Labor); Rasch v.
Allied Elec., No. 67836, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 134 (8th App. Dist. Jan. 18, 1996)
(asserting a claim for damages because of plaintiff's terimnation based on an allegedly
wrongful accusation of sexual harassment); Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinus & Hollister, 105
Ohio App. 3d 295 (1st App. Dist. 1995), appeal dismissed, 75 Ohio St. 3d 1204 (1996)
(asserting a claim for damages because plaintiff was terminated as a result of his sexual
orientation m violation of Cincinnati's Human Rights Ordinance).
98 As one commentator has noted:
The resolution of all the questions that must be addressed before an informal decision to
modify the at will rule can be made requires either the interpretation of complex
statistical data or the formulation of public policy. The courts do not have the
investigatory machinery to analyze complex socio-economic statistical data, nor are they
properly empowered with the right to formulate and implement public policy.
James E. DeFranco, Modification of the Employment-at-Will Doctnne-Balancng Judictal
Development of the Common Law with the Legislative Prerogative to Declare Public Policy,
30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 65, 107 (1985).
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"would, among other things, place Ohio's courts in the untenable position of
having to second-guess the business judgments of employers." 9  If the past is
any reflection of things to come, chaos could soon predominate the employer-
employee relationship. In analyzing these problems, along with suggesting an
alternative approach, this Comment will look to other jurisdictions' wrongful
termination statutes, paying particularly close attention to Montana's statutory
based approach as well as a cursory evaluation of the Model Employment
Termination Act.
1. Uncertainty in the Law
The quest for legal certainty m the context of the employment relationship
is a major concern for all parties involved. 10 For instance, employees need
certainty m order to allow them to protect themselves from abusive discharges,
as well as maximize their economic potential.101 Likewise, employers need
certainty m the employment context in order to provide some guidance
throughout the termination process. Employers, moreover, need certainty in the
remedy provisions to allow them some protection to terminate deserving
employees.102 Additionally, unpredictable employment laws may conflict with
99 Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ohio 1985).100 See Hahn & Smith, supra note 1, at 535.
101 There is the possibility of a "chilling effect" when uncertainty predominates the
employer-employee relatonship. Specifically, employers will be less likely to terminate
employees, which leads to a reduction m demand for new workers. In this sense, uncertainty
in the law amounts to a "regressive tax" on potential employees. See DeFranco, supra note
98, at 78-79; Jeffrey L. Harrison, The "New" Ternunable-at-Will Employment Contract: An
Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IowA L. REv 327, 360 (1984).
102 An employer may be forced to retain a below-average employee for fear that the
employer has insufficient evidence to document the employee's incompetence. The employer,
therefore, might be forced to retain a less efficient worker even if more efficient workers are
available. The result is less productivity per employee and less efficient manufacturing of a
product or providing of a service. Moreover, an employee retained for fear of litigation may
cause severe morale problems among the employee's coworkers. See DeFranco, supra note
98, at 78.
A nationwide survey of 260 wrongful termination cases between January 1986 and
October 1988 found that in the 166 cases won by employees, the average award was
$602,302, with a median of $158,800. See IRA SEPARD Er AL., THE BuREAu OF NAT'L
AFFAIRS, INc., WrTHouT Jusr CAUsE: AN EMPLOYER'S PRACICAL AND LEGAL GuimE ON
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 16 (1989).
Throughout the country, single individuals have received damages for a wrongful
termination suit as high as $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, and $2.5 million. See
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legislative attempts to create an attractive business climate m the state.10 3
Finally, to all parties involved, certainty lowers litigation costs that are now
such an unproductive dram on our economy 104 In addition to actual litigation
costs, expensive "defensive" termination practices also can be lowered. 10 5 Both
employees and employers benefit by this lowering of expenses. It could, for
example, potentially increase employees' pay and benefits.' 0 6 Likewise, this
saved money could be reinvested by employers into developing human capital
in addition to increasing productivity.10 7
Contrary to these goals, the rationale set forth in Collins provides only
amorphous notions of public policy From this uncertainty, employers are not
able to structure progressive termination policies which allow them to avoid the
MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Act, prefatory note, (National Conference of
Comussioners on Uniform State Laws 1991).
103 See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 885 (M. 1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
I do not believe that this court should further contribute to the declining business
environment by creating a vague concept of public policy which will permit an
employer to discharge an unwanted employee only at the risk of being sued m
tort not only for compensatory damages, but also for punitive damages.
Id.
104 A 1988 survey by the Rand Institute of wrongful termination suits m California
found that the average cost of litigation incurred in defending a wrongful termination is
$80,073 and the median is $65,000. See JAMES N. DERTOVZOS Er AL., THE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERmATION 38 (Rand Corp. 1988). In addition,
litigation costs for employees are typically based on a contingency of 40% of the award. See
id. at 39. Thus, with combined legal fees exceeding $150,000 on average, the cost of
litigation is nearly as great as the average total monetary amount awarded to successful
employees m wrongful termination suits. See u. at 35.
105 Defensive termination practices would include, among other things, spending more
money on extensive employee files, long and oppressive grievance procedures and the
necessity of legal advice prior, during, and after termination proceedings. While many of
these costs are present in current employer-employee relationships, these costs are
presumably increased when uncertainty predominates the arena in order to allow employers to
fully document an employee's shortcomings.
106 See RiCHARD A. POSNER, OvERcomING THE LAw 309 (1995); see also Harrison,
supra note 101, at 360 (1984); Harrison, The Price of Public Policy Modification of the
Ternunable-at-Will Rule, 1983 LAB. L.J. 581, 583; Cyntlua E. Boeye, Comment,
Employment at Will: An Analysis and Critique of the Judicial Role, 68 IowA L. REv 787,
800 (1983).
107 See generally Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the
United States, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv 644 (1991).
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dram of wrongful termination suits. Given the multiple sources from which a
public policy exception can now be discovered, courts are faced with the
daunting, if not impossible, task of determining an exception with any
particularity Conceivably under Collins, public policy could be subject to the
whims of individual judges. As such, merits of cases will often not be
determined by the law, but rather by clever counsel.10 8 Yet, those who see this
amorphous nature of the exception as a positive development for employees
need to remember that the Collins framework provides a two-way street. Rights
that should be protected can just as easily be taken away. Moreover, given the
inconsistent jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Ohio on this issue, the
public policy exception could again be severely curtailed, or even abandoned, if
judicial philosophies change. 10 9
Equally as serious, Collins adds uncertainty to the possible remedies
available to a wrongfully discharged employee. For example, there is
considerable doubt as to what constitutes the proper restitution for such a
wrongful termination suit.110 Such a result could harm all parties involved.
Employees, for instance, would be at risk that they will not be able to recover
all damages to which they are entitled due to unsympathetic judges and juries.
Likewise, employers could be subject to damages far in excess of what is
deserved, even m spite of laws claiming otherwise. Finally, confidence as a
whole in the courts could suffer as citizens would see them not as a forum
where wrongs are vindicated, but where cases are determined by any number
of subjective factors.
2. The Precision Paradox
Under the Collins rationale, the Supreme Court of Ohio suggests that when
public policy can be discerned only from multiple sources, preemption must be
clear and unambiguous in at least one statute in order for a common law
recovery to be pre-empted.111 As Justice Resnick stated in her opinion, "We do
10 8 See Hahn & Smith, supra note 1, at 527-28.
109 This Note acknowledges that stare decisis may provide guidance to protect the
current public policy exception from judicial whims. It is the contention of this Note,
however, that the Supreme Court of Olno has been rather cavalier when dealing with stare
dectsis m past public policy cases. Consequently, this policy, while unlikely, needs to be
addressed.
110 With this analysis, many questions remain unanswered. For instance, how clear must
a remedy provision be in order for it to be pre-emptive?
11I Yet, given the relatively new development of the public policy exception, most
legislation was passed without an opportunity to address any potential wrongful termination
implications.
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not mean to suggest that where a statute's coverage provisions form an essential
part of its public policy, we may extract a policy from the statute and use it to
nullify the statute's own coverage provisions. ' 112 Thus, an interesting paradox
is created. Where a public policy is clearly defined and remedy provisions are
given, courts are precluded from allowing damages above and beyond the
statutory provisions. Taken to the extreme, it appears that only when a public
policy is vague and unspecified can a common law cause of action be
presented. Accordingly, where a public policy cannot be discerned from a
single statute, thus requiring the court to create a policy decision on its own by
stringing various statutes together, courts have unfettered discretion in allowing
a recovery amount.
This interesting paradox has implications which affect all interested parties.
Where the Ohio Legislature has found a specific policy problem and addressed
it by means of a statute, the legislature has expressed its will to limit a
terminated employee's available damages. 113 Thus, a conscious decision is
made to provide an employer with a cap on what it may be required to pay On
the other hand, the court's discretion is the greatest where the Oio Legislature
has chosen not to directly legislate on an issue, but has tangentially addressed it
in several statutes. However, the court overlooks the possibility that the Ohio
Legislature's silence on the issue may have indicated a policy decision not to
regulate such conduct. Additionally, employers may be fearful to risk certain
terminations, which the Ohio Legislature may have conscientiously allowed, for
fear of the unlimited nature of vague public policy claims. Hence, it appears
that the Supreme Court of Ohio, in effect, may be protecting rights of
employees that were conscientiously rejected by the Oio Legislature more than
those wich the legislature actually intended to protect.
3. Confusion Created by Common Law
In allowing judicial decisions to serve as a source for public policy
exceptions, the Supreme Court of Oio has created a system which may
engender protracted case-by-case litigation to define its scope. Such an
approach would render any prediction of future cases "a hazardous undertaking
at best."1 14 As one commentator noted, "[The expectations are not easy to
articulate, and it should not be too surprising when a judicial decision in an
112 Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 661 (Ohio 1995).
113 See, e.g., Ohio's whistleblower statute, OHIo REv CODE ANN. § 4113.52
(Baldwin 1994). For a more detailed discussion of this statute, see nfra notes 122-26
and accompanying text.
114 See Cavico, supra note 5, at 519.
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evolving area of private law does not articulate ideally the reasoning underlying
its result." 115 After the above discussion of the need for certainty m
employment law, one can easily see how ill-advised common law foundations
for public policy exceptions would be. 116
Additionally, using common law as public policy would completely
eliminate any legislative role m determining public policy 117 Indeed, under
such an approach, the courts would be usurping a defined legislative
function. 118 Furthermore, what expertise do the courts hold m tis area? The
courts may, in fact, be injecting themselves into a role they are il-equpped to
play
IV SOLUTIONS
Most major changes m employment law during this century, with the
notable exception of wrongful termination causes of action, have been made by
means of federal and state legislation. 119 Providing an opportunity to have a
direct say m the evolution of the common law, legislation provides a means to
account for the shortcomings of the employment at will doctnne. 120 While
undoubtedly legislative proposals are subject to outside influence of lobbying
115 Leonard, supra note 11, at 658-59; see also Lee Crawford, You're Fired! Public
Policy Wrongfid Discharge, 54 Tx. B.J. 330, 331 (1991); Louis L. Rabem, Jr., et al.,
Wrongfid Discharge: A Panel Discussion, Panel at the American Bar Association Annual
Meeting (1989), in 6 LAB. LAW., Spring 1990, at 319, 327
116 Some courts, however, have adopted common law as a basis for public policy
exceptions. As one court noted:
Limiting the scope of public policy to legislative enactments would necessarily elimiate
aspects of the public interest which deserve protection but have limited access to the
political process. Judicial decisions can also enunciate substantial principles of public
policy m areas which the legislature has not treated.
Berube v. Fasuon Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989). Judicial activism m this
regard, however, may be infringing on intentional legislative silence on the issue.117 See Cavico, supra note 5, at 518-19.
118 See, e.g., State v. Smorgala, 553 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ohio 1990) ("Judicial policy
preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General
Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.").
119 See Pemtt, supra note 79, at 422.
120 One commentator has advanced that codification of wrongful termination law is
especially likely to arise where judicial activism in recognizing exceptions to the employment
at will doctrine has been especially dramatic. See Krueger, supra note 107, at 644.
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and the like, they can, and sometimes do, reflect an approach beneficial to all
parties involved.121
A legislative remedy to these problems would not be unprecedented. Oluo
has, in the past, codified public policy exceptions to the employment at will
doctrine. Among the most notable, Ohio's whistleblower statute122 provides
specific procedures an employee must follow in order to gain statutory
protections as a wlustleblower.123 Thus, the whistleblower statute resolves four
problems presented by a common law approach to defining a public policy
exception.124 First, it affords employees legislated rights that are protected and
intractable by the courts. Second, employers are presented with measures of
assurances of what are acceptable termination practices. Third, procedural
safeguards afford the employer the opportunity to correct the situation before it
121 Forty states, at one time or another, have had bills concerning "employment
termination, at-will employment, or a related subject." See MODEL EMLOYMENr
TEmMNATION ACr, prefatory note, (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws 1991) (citing a survey by Professor Stuart Henry of Eastern Michigan Umversity).122 See OMo REv CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (Baldwin 1994).
123 Specifically, the text of section 4113.52 provides protection when the following
requirements have first been satisfied: (1) the employee provided oral notification to the
employer; (2) the employee then filed a timely written report with the supervisor; (3) the
employer then failed to correct the violation or make a reasonable good faith effort to correct
the violation. See Oiuo REV CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (Baldwin 1994); see also Contreras v.
Ferro Corp., 652 N.E.2d 940, 944 (Ohio 1995).
124 To date, at least thirty-five state legislatures have passed similar versions of
whistleblower statutes. See ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.100 (1992); Aiz. REV STAT. ANN. § 38-
532 (West 1992); COLO. REv STAT. ANN. § 24-50.5-101 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-51m (West Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (Supp. 1994); FIA. STAT.
ANN. § 112.3187 (West Supp. 1992); HAW. REV STAT. § 378-61 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 127, para. 63b91 (Smith-Hurd. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-8-8 (West Supp. 1996);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.28 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (Supp. 1995); Ky.
REV STAT. ANN. § 61.102 (Michie 1993); ME. REv STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 831 (West Supp.
1988); MD. CODE ANN. art. 64A, § 12F (Supp. 1992); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17 421 (Supp.
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932 (West Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.055
(Vernon Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-1 (West Supp. 1996); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740
(West Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-84 (1995); OMO REV CODE ANN. § 4113.51
(Anderson 1991), O.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 840-2.5 (West 1995); OR. REv STAT. ANN.
§ 659.505 (Supp. 1994); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1421 (Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 8-27-10 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1995), TEM. CODE ANN. §§ 49-50-1401 (1990) & 50-1-304
(Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-1 (1995); WASH. REv CODE ANN. § 42.40.010
(West Supp. 1996); W VA. CODE § 06C-1-1 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.80 (%Vest
1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-910 (Supp. 1992).
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reaches the court. 125 Finally, specific procedures and remedies are provided to
ensure all parties involved predictability 126
The state of Montana, in passing the Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act, has presented the most significant development at the state
level in legislative responses to employment law Indeed, Montana was one of a
growing number of jurisdictions which began to recogmze the tort of wrongful
discharge. Responding to the increased concern regarding large jury awards, 127
high defense costs, and uncertainty as to the exact parameters of the law, the
state legislature adopted the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act in May of 1987.128 The Act gives rise to a cause of action for terminations,
which, among other things, are in retaliation for an employee's refusal to
violate public policy 129 Additionally, Montana's statute creates a "just cause"
standard of review for most termination cases. Compensatory damages for lost
wages and benefits are allowable for a maximum of four years, but no other
damages are allowable unless an employee can establish actual fraud or malice
on behalf of the employer. Arbitration is an optional remedy-available only
when both parties agree. Finally, the statute expressly preempts common law
claims that may arise. 130
125 See Omo REv CODEANN. § 4113.52(A)(3) (Baldwin 1994).
126 For a further discussion of wiustleblower statutes, see generally MARCiA P MICELL
& JANET P NEAR, BLOWING THE Wr-m: TiE ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL
IMPUCATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLoYEEs (1992); DANiEL P WStrMAN,
WHmSami.owiNG THE LAw oF RETALATORY DISCHARGE (1991); Sheldon E. Friedman,
Whustleblowing: A Growing Trend, 19 CoLO. LAw. 1313 (1990); Lois A. Lofgren,
Comment, Whstleblower Protection: Should LegIslatures and the Courts Provide a Shelter to
Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D.
L. REV 316 (1993).
127 See, e.g., Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 720 P.2d 257 (Mont.
1986) (awarding former employee $1.3 million for punitive damages, $100,000 for emotional
distress, and $93,000 for economic losses by a Montana jury where employer violated
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by making false promises that an employee terminated
for economic reasons would be rehired if she took a week-long training program).
12 8 See Jonathan Tompkins, Legislating the Employment Relationshlp: Montana's
Wrongfid-Discharge Law, 14 EMP. REL. L.J. 387, 387 (1988).129 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1994).
130 For a more complete analysis of Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act, see, e.g., Leonard Bierman & Stuart A. Youngblood, Interpreting Montana's
Pathbrealang Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A Prelinunary Analysts, 53 MoNT.
L. REV 53 (1992); LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REv 94 (1990);
Tompkins, supra note 128, at 392.
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In addition to Montana's legislative alternatives, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted and approved the Model
Employment Termination Act (Model Act) m August, 1991. The prmary
purpose of the Model Act is to provide uniformity m employment termination
law among the states that adopt it. Such efficiency and predictability is
significant to an employer because it "obviously benefits from being able to
have standardized personnel policies that would be effective beyond state
lines." 131 Similar to Montana, the Model Act changes the underlying nature of
the employer-employee relationshp. The Model Act provides that, as a general
rule, "an employer may not terminate the employment of an employee without
good cause."' 132 The Model Act, in addition to the good cause requirement,
also includes jurisdiction and mandatory arbitration provisions.
The Model Act, however, has engendered a significant amount of
controversy over its effectiveness and purpose. 133 To date, no state has yet
131 MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr, prefatory note, (National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1991).
132 Id. § 1. Specifically, good cause is defined as:
(i) a reasonable basis related to an individual employee for termination of the
employee's employment m view of relevant factors and circumstances, which may
include the employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct on the job or otherwise, job
performance, and employment record, or (ii) the exercise of business judgment in
good faith by the employer, including setting its economic or institutional goals and
determining methods to achieve those goals, organizing or reorganizing operations,
discontinuing, consolidating, or divesting operations or positions or parts of
operations or positions, determining the size of its work force and the nature of the
positions filled by its work force, and determining and changing standards of
performance for positions.
Id.
133 For those commentators supporting the Model Act, see generally Theodore J. St.
Antoine, The Malang of the Model Employment Termnation Act, 69 WASH. L. REV 361
(1994); Debra Drew Cyranoski, Comment, The Model Employment Temination Act: A
Welcome Solution to the Problem of Disparity Among State Laws, 37 VLL. L. REv 1527
(1992).
For those commentators expressing critiques of the Model Act, see generally Michael S.
Franczak, The Model Employment Termination Act (META): Does It Violate the Right to
Trial by Jury?, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESoL. 441 (1995); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle
Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993);
Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger" A Critique of the Model Employment
Ternmnation Act, 43 Am. U. L. REV 849 (1994); Jeanne Duquette Gorr, Comment, The
Model Employment Tenmnation Act: Fruifid Seed or Noxous Weed?, 31 DuQ. L. REv. 111
(1992); Dawn S. Perry, Comment, Detemng Egregious Violations of Public Policy: A
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adopted it. Given the lack of popularity as well as the controversy surrounding
the Model Act, it is unlikely that Ohio, which has traditionally been
conservative in passing employment laws, would adopt such a radical measure.
Any successful legislation in Ohio would need to be significantly narrower in
scope.
Evaluating whether legislative proposals have achieved any success often
lies in the viewpoint from which a party stands. 134 Recent commentators have
suggested four principal issues surrounding the creation of wrongful discharge
legislation:
1) Protections established: What standard should govern terminations of
employment relations? Should high level employees be covered by the statutory
protections, and if so, should the standard be the same as for lower level
employees? 135
2) Coverage of the act: Should economically motivated eliminations of
positions and layoffs be covered by the statute, and if so, what standards should
govern such events?
3) Remedies: What statutory damages and other common law remedies, if any,
should be available to terminated employees?
4) Procedure: What dispute resolution methods should the Act u"tlize?136
Indeed, the fact that only one state has successfully passed a wrongful
termination statute, while many others have failed, demonstrates the political
volatility of these issues. 137
Proposed Amendment to the Model Employment Termnation Act, 67 WASH. L. REV 915
(1992).
134 See Hahn & Smith, supra note 1, at 526.
135 Additional questions could include: Given that higher level employees are usually
subject to more subjective criteria, should wrongful termination legislation recognize this fact
and make the appropriate distinctions?
136 See u. at 527-28.
137 Currently, several states have wrongful termination statutes pending action m their
respective legislative bodies. Presented below is a brief overview of some of the provisions.
California: S. 774, 1995-96 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995), available in Westlaw, CA-BILLS
Database:
Recognizes that existing law does not expressly prescribe or limit the amount of damages
recoverable on wrongful discharge of an employee m violation of public policy; the bill
attempts to limit the sum of any compensatory damages for future pecunary losses,
nonpecuniary losses, exemplary damages, and any admiustrative fines. The amount
awarded to a successful claimant is determined by the number of persons employed by
the employer against whom the damages are asserted.
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H. 355, 18th Leg. (Haw. 1995), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, MITEXT File:
Establishes uniform employment termination law unless otherwise provided in an
agreement for severance pay, or for a specified duration; prohibits an employer from
terminating the employment of an employee without "good cause;" provides criteria for
good cause; establishes procedures and limitations for employees and employers relating
to demand for arbitration upon the termination of any employee; requires arbitrators,
within 30 days, to mail or deliver to the parties a written award sustainng or dismissing
a compliant.
Missouri: H. 1111, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
MOTEXT File:
Introduced to, except for some minor exceptions such as collective bargaming
agreements, state or federal statutes, or an agreement otherwise, displace and extinguish
all common law rights and claims of a terminated employee against a former employer.
Unless otherwise provided in an agreement for severance pay or for a specified duration,
an employer may not terminate the employee without good cause.
New York: S. 4103, 219th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y 1995), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, NYEXT File:
Prohibits discharging alien employees who are legally restricted from other employment
unless good cause for discharge is shown.
Oklahoma: S. 564, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1995), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, OKTEXT File:
Provides that an employer may not terminate an employee without good cause, unless
otherwise provided in an agreement for severance pay or for a specified duration;
providing that a terminated employee may file an action or demand arbitration.
Virginia: H. 1375, 1996 Sess. (Va. 1996), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, VATEXT
File:
Prohibits employers from discharging, disciplining or penalizing any employee who, in
the course of his employment, refuses to take any employer-directed action that would
endanger public safety.
See also H. 874, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1996), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
MOTEXT File; H. 1343, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1995), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, OKTEXT File; H. 1344, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1995), available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, OKTEXT File.
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What would be the objective goals that an Ohio public policy statute would
attempt to resolve? First, any statute must limit the discretion of the courts m
finding public policy exceptions. However, the statute would need to allow
some flexibility, although considerably less than now exists, to protect
important employee rights not yet articulated. In deference to the legislature, a
public policy statute should limit recovery only when it could be a logical
extension of articulated legislative intent to protect an employee's right. Second,
to ensure that frivolous clains are not warranted, a violation must be of as
serious import as the violation of a statute. Additionally, remedies must be
precisely defined and limited. Generally, they should include backpay and
frontpay, as well as attorney's fees. Reinstatement could potentially be an
option, although this should not be encouraged for a variety of reasons. 138
Punitive damages should only be allowed m instances where an employer's
conduct has been especially egregious. Finally, a proposed public policy statute
should not fundamentally alter the existing employment relationship by creating
a just cause standard or alter the basic premise of the at will status. 139 Similarly,
138 These reasons include the option of frontpay for a period of years available to
compensate for any difference that might arise from a disparity m a lack of pay between a
former job and a current one. Likewise, it may be detrimental to all parties involved to
require the reinstatement of an employee into a hostile environment.
139 The purpose of this proposed legislation is not to fundamentally alter the employment
at will status m the workplace. Rather, it is intended to provide a remedy to solve some
problems inherent m Oluo's current public policy junsprudence. Many articles have
specifically dealt with the merits of a just cause standard of termination to alter the
employment at will context. One of the more interesting recent articles is written by law and
economics gum Richard Posner. Posner provides an interesting perspective on the
employment at will doctrine, defending it against any just cause proposal. Specifically, Posner
provides a practical analysis on why a just cause regime would harm, rather than help,
employees. Posner finds that just cause legislation would, among other things, decrease
employees' wages, increase employment, and decrease employees' discretion. See Posner,
supra note 106, at 305-11. For other commentators supporting the employment at will
doctrine, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will. 51 U. Ci. L. REv 947
(1984) (defending the employment at will doctrine on both economic and ethical grounds);
Mayer G. Freed & Danel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Tenmnation Rules and Economic
Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989); Gail L. Henot, The New Feudalism: The Unintended
Destination of Contemporary Trends in Employment Law, 28 GA. L. REv 167 (1993);
Edward P Lazear, Employment-at-Will, Job Security and Work Incentives, in EMPLOYMENT,
UN PLOYr TAND LABOR UTiATION 39 (Robert A. Hart ed., 1988).
For commentators making arguments opposed to the employment at will doctrine, see
Drudilla Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique of Employment at Will, 10 CARDOzo
L. REv 1575 (1989) (putting forth a Hegelian critique of employment at will); Leonard,
supra note 11, at 631.
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it should encourage alternative dispute resolution, but in no way should the
proposed statute require it. 140
A suggested statute could read:
The Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Doctrine
(1) For a claim for damages to be recognized for the public policy exception,
all of the following criteria must be met:
(a) where the exception is a logical and clear extension of articulated
legislative intent to protect an employee's right; and
(b) where the exception is of at least equally serious inport as a statute;
and
(c) the complaint has been brought within two years from the time of
dismissal.
(2) Any party can request arbitration and such arbitration shall be allowed only
with the consent of the other party If a party refuses to arbitrate and loses the
case in the courts, that party shall be liable for all court costs incurred.
(3) Remedies for a wrongful termination action based on a public policy
exception shall be limited to:
(a) Backpay" Such backpay shall be reduced by an amount which could
have been made had the claimant made reasonable attempts to procure
other employment.
(b) Frontpay" (i) Such frontpay shall not be extended for more than a
period of two years; and (ii) Shall be reduced by any amount received as a
result of future employment enabled by the claimant's termination or such
an amount had the claimant made reasonable attempts to procure future
employment.
(c) Attorney fees: Such fees shall be recoverable from the employer in a
successful action by the claimant.
(d) Reinstatement shall be an option only if both parties agree.
,(4) Only in cases of egregious behavior on the part of the employer shall
punitive damages be awarded.
140 While it is the contention of this Note that alternative dispute resolutions offer
attractive options to the judicial process, to mandate them would fundamentally change the
nature of the termination process. Rather, to do so would go beyond the scope of this
proposal, which is merely to provide a simple, yet flexible, resolution to the amorphous and
unpredictable nature of Ohio's current public policy jurisprudence.
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V CONCLUSION
Oluo courts must be commended for joining the great majority of
jurisdictions which recognize some form of a public policy exception to the
harshness of the employment at will doctrine. In its enthusiasm, however, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has gone too far in proposing a virtually limitless list of
sources in which public policy can be discerned. It has, additionally, created a
current jurisprudence where uncertainty predominates. As such, current Ohio
jurisprudence infringes too far on the discretion of employers, often placing
them in constant apprehension of potential wrongful termination suits.
To rectify this undesirable situation, legislative guidance offers the most
potential for success. It affords employees the accessibility and protection of a
public policy exception. Moreover, it allows employers predictability and
further allows them to conform their termination policies with the law, taking
away the potential risk of a wrongful termination suit. Undeniably, workplace
relations stir up deep passions in the heart of all interested parties. Taking this
into account, a legislative alternative provides the best means to ensure the
rights of all interested parties.
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